






Compulsory Voting, Inequality, and Quality of the Vote: 







Democratic elections imply that the electorate holds incumbents accountable for past performance, 
and that voters select the party that is closest to their own political preferences. Previous research 
shows both elements require political sophistication. A number of countries throughout the world 
have a system of compulsory voting, and this legal obligation boosts levels of voter turnout. Under 
such rules, citizens with low levels of sophistication in particular are thought to turn out to vote in 
higher numbers. Is it the case that the quality of the vote is reduced when these less-sophisticated 
voters are compelled to vote? This article investigates this claim by examining the effect of 
compulsory voting on accountability and proximity voting. The results show that compulsory 
voting reduces stratification based on knowledge and level of education, and proximity voting, but 
it does not have an effect on economic accountability. The article concludes with some suggestions 
on how systems of compulsory voting might mitigate the strength of political sophistication in 
determining the quality of the vote decision process. 
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Is high voter turnout a good thing for representative democracy? During the past decades, this 
apparently very simple question has led to heated debates within the field of electoral research. The 
answer to the question, of course, has huge political and social consequences. If high turnout levels 
improve electoral representation, it is a straightforward suggestion to take any measure possible to 
ensure high voter turnout, including the introduction of compulsory voting (Lijphart 1997). If high 
turnout levels would not matter all that much, the current trend toward declining levels of voter 
turnout should not necessarily be seen as problematic (Hooghe 2014). On the one hand, some 
scholars emphasize the fact that high voter turnout serves as a political equalizer (Avery 2015). If 
a very large proportion of the electorate turns out to vote, the possibilities for inequality or 
distortion of the electoral signal are mathematically strongly reduced. Other scholars, however, are 
more concerned about the quality of the vote. Their main fear is that if citizens are forced to vote, 
this obligation might lead to a superficial boost in voter turnout as those that are least interested in 
politics turn out to vote. In that case, it is assumed, these ‘forced’ voters will either cast blank or 
invalid votes (Mackerras and McAllister 1999) or vote in a rather random manner (Selb and Lachat 
2009), thus eroding the representative function of elections. The main idea in the debate is, 
therefore, that we are confronted with a trade-off between high turnout and equality on the one 
hand, and quality of the vote on the other (Rosema 2007). However, very few studies, thus far, 
have investigated whether the concerns of equality and quality are mutually exclusive. 
Liberal democracies, then, appear to be confronted with a conundrum resulting from this 
debate. Either they focus on the quantity of the vote (i.e., high turnout), or they focus on the quality 
of the vote, (i.e. having knowledgeable voters). What is missing in the current debate, however, is 
a clear conceptualization of what is the “quality of the vote”. Routinely, this concept is 
operationalized as the ideological distance between voters and their preferred party, although this 
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concept has also been contested in the literature (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). From the theory on 
representative politics we know that there are two vote-choice mechanisms that allow the 
realization of representation through elections. On the one hand, it is thought of foremost 
importance that voters use elections to hold incumbents accountable for the policy they have 
pursued. Being held accountable by the voters, and the possibility of being thrown out of office, is 
a powerful incentive for politicians to deliver on their electoral promises (Przeworski et al. 1999). 
On the other hand, scholars have stressed that it is important that voters vote prospectively, casting 
a vote for the political party that is ideologically closest to their own preferences (Campbell et al. 
1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). By doing so, voters give a policy mandate to parties. While such 
mandates could be given with respect to a multitude of issues, ideology serves as an efficient 
shortcut for estimating issue positions (Downs 1957; Rosema 2007). If we take the argument of 
representational quality seriously, both mechanisms could contribute to a well-functioning 
electoral democracy. In this article we therefore include both mechanisms, a step that has not yet 
been taken by earlier research on compulsory voting. It falls outside the scope of the current article 
to assess the relative importance of both mechanisms. As our ambition is mainly empirical, we 
considered it as safe option to test both the mechanism of proximity voting and the occurrence of 
accountability voting, so the results of our analysis should be relevant for both theoretical 
approaches. Furthermore, we introduce solid comparative empirical material to this discussion that 
thus far has been conducted to a large extent on normative grounds (Brennan and Hill 2014). If 
systems of compulsory voting indeed erode the mechanisms of accountability and proximity 
voting, the only obvious conclusion should be that this legal obligation does not contribute to the 
overall quality of the electoral process.  
Compulsory voting is an interesting phenomenon for our theoretical endeavor to understand 
the interplay between institutional rules and individual voter motivations (see the guest editors in 
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their introduction to this special issue). We know from previous research that political 
sophistication and ideological preferences have a strong effect on the voting decisions taken by 
citizens (Bartels 1996; De Vries and Giger 2014). As a result, citizens with low levels of political 
knowledge, or without strong convictions, have few incentives to find the party that best fits their 
preferences. In the context of compulsory voting, however, the ‘natural’ default option of not 
voting at all is closed off, with as a potential consequence that this group will cast a rather random 
vote, that does not contribute to the quality of electoral representation. If the ‘forced’ voters lack 
interest, knowledge, and sophistication and if political sophistication is a precondition for 
accountability and proximity, forcing non-sophisticated voters to cast a vote is inherently 
problematic. Imposing or removing a system of compulsory voting, therefore, can have a direct 
effect on the individual decision to turn out to vote or not (Singh 2015; Irwin 1974). As emphasized 
in the introduction to this special issue, this implies that voters take into account a set of country-
specific decision rules into their own vote choice decision. As the least sophisticated are forced to 
vote, it becomes all the more relevant to know how successful this group will be in identifying the 
party that fits their evaluation and their preferences. We use data from all four modules of the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project and from the 2014 PartiRep Belgian 
Election Study to investigate these claims. Our analyses cover up to 113 elections in 44 countries 
between 1996 and 2015, including representative samples from multiple countries with some form 
of compulsory voting.1 
 
Compulsory voting 
Several democratic systems have introduced compulsory voting (Birch 2009; Malkopoulou 2015). 
This decision was often motivated by a concern to protect newly enfranchised groups of the 
population from any effort to inhibit them from using their democratic rights. Especially in 
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predominantly Catholic countries, compulsory voting was also meant to send a signal that ‘good’ 
citizens with a sense of civic duty should vote. The adoption of compulsory voting proved to be 
effective in increasing turnout. The staggered implementation of compulsory voting in Australian 
provinces, for example, increased turnout by about 24 percentage points (Fowler 2013). 
Comparative studies show compulsory voting increases turnout, on average, by about 5 to 10 
percentage points (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). In countries like Belgium and Australia where the 
obligation is strictly enforced, turnout rates remain above 90% (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). In a 
country like Paraguay, on the other hand, most citizens are aware of the fact that this rule is no 
longer enforced and voter turnout only reached 68% in the latest elections. Compulsory voting can 
also alter the political system in other ways. Jensen and Spoon (2011), for example, find 
compulsory voting increases the effective number of parties and increases the range of ideological 
positions in government. 
As the 20th century progressed, however, upholding this legal obligation became 
increasingly difficult, as new age cohorts questioned the right of the state to impose such a legal 
obligation. The abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands in 1970, Chile in 2012 and the 
more gradual process of abolishing compulsory voting in Austria are examples of states 
abandoning compulsory voting, with as a result marked decreases in turnout in each country (Irwin 
1974; Miller and Dassonneville forthcoming; Navia and del Pozo 2012; Ferwerda 2014) and 
increased stratification in the voting population (Irwin 1974).  
This drives home the message that, despite all the obvious practical difficulties, compulsory 
voting still boosts voter turnout. It is, however, important to include information on the degree to 
which voter turnout is enforced. In this study, therefore, we will include information on the extent 
to which compulsory voting is actually enforced. 
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The observation that compulsory voting has a powerful effect on voter turnout has received 
new attention, as liberal democracies are experiencing a rapid decline in voter turnout since the 
1980s (Hooghe 2014; Gray and Caul 2000). Various efforts have been undertaken to counter this 
trend, but none appear to match the effect of compulsory voting to increase turnout. Postal and 
internet voting only seem to have a limited effect on turnout (Gerber et al. 2013; Alvarez et al. 
2009). Proposals to introduce systems of compulsory voting, on the other hand, are often met with 
the counterargument that states should not impose the legal obligation to cast a vote, as this is a 
decision that should be taken in an autonomous manner by the individual citizen (Hill 2006).  
In the empirical debate about compulsory voting, the arguments are straightforward. 
Supporters of compulsory voting argue that the system increases turnout and reduces socio-
economic inequalities. If compulsory voting is strictly enforced, it is associated with turnout levels 
in the range of 90 percent of the electorate, leaving very little leeway for any distortion of the 
electoral signal. Most of the available empirical research shows that electoral inequalities are 
weaker in systems of compulsory voting, as those with lower levels of education or, in general, a 
lower socio-economic status will be compelled to vote (Gallego 2010; Irwin 1974; Jaitman 2013; 
Singh 2011; 2015; Henn and Oldfield forthcoming).  
It also has to be noted, however, that not all empirical research confirms this expectation. 
Older age groups, for example, react more strongly to having a system of compulsory voting 
(Quintelier et al. 2011). A survey of British 18-year olds revealed nonvoters would be more likely 
to vote under a compulsory voting regime, however compulsory voting may also produce a sense 
of resentment toward democratic politics in Britain (Henn and Oldfield forthcoming). An analysis 
of turnout in Brazil has furthermore shown that the higher educated are more easily targeted by 
administrative sanctions, thus widening the turnout gap between high- and low-educated citizens 
(Cepaluni and Hildalgo 2016). Comparative survey data from the Latinobarometer demonstrates 
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that compulsory voting leads to higher dissatisfaction with democracy in this region because anti-
democratic voters are compelled to appear at the polls (Singh forthcoming). We, therefore, begin 
our analyses by assessing whether compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of electoral 
inequality. 
Given that most research finds compulsory voting to increase turnout among low 
sophisticated and low involved citizens, the obvious argument against compulsory voting is that it 
might contribute to quantity, but that simultaneously it erodes the quality of the vote, and that it 
therefore does not contribute to democratic representation (Jakee and Sun 2006). Selb and Lachat 
(2009) show that especially the less interested and low knowledgeable will be compelled to vote 
when they are obliged to. Because of their lack of political sophistication, this group of voters is 
less successful in correctly identifying the political party that is best able to represent their own 
preferences. The authors conclude that compulsory voting reduces the accuracy of the electoral 
signal.  
A counter-argument to such accounts might be, however, that compulsory voting could 
increase political sophistication. If citizens are forced to vote, they receive an incentive to acquire 
more political information so that they are able to cast a meaningful vote. Most studies, however, 
do not find evidence for the claim that compulsory voting increases levels of political sophistication 
(Carreras 2016; Quintelier et al. 2011). Sheppard (2015), by contrast, has found political 
knowledge is somewhat elevated under compulsory voting rules. 
From this review of the literature, it becomes evident that it is too early to conclude that 
compulsory reduces the quality of the vote. First, Sheppard’s work (2015) hints at a potential 
positive impact of compulsory voting. In addition, the Selb and Lachat (2009) study remained 
limited to a single country, and they only considered the proximity function of elections. 
Accountability, i.e., holding incumbents accountable for what they have done, however, is equally 
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important, and therefore we will investigate both these functions of elections in a comparative 
research design. Given the repeated finding that compulsory voting reduces inequalities based on 
education level and political knowledge, and taking into account that these indicators of 
sophistication are essential in order to cast an informed vote, our working hypothesis is that the 
mechanisms of accountability and proximity voting will be weaker in countries with compulsory 
voting. 
The ambition of the current article is not to contribute to the theoretical or normative debate. 
Rather, we want to investigate whether compulsory voting contributes to the professed goals of 
representative democracy. We do not consider high turnout as a goal by itself. Rather we 
investigate to what extent it contributes to accountability and representation. 
 
Accountability and proximity voting 
Citizens casting a vote can be motivated by retrospective and prospective considerations. First, 
voting retrospectively and holding incumbents accountable for their performance is a mechanism 
that contributes to democratic representation. The fear of being punished for bad performance 
incentivizes incumbents to govern in the best interests of their voters (Przeworski et al. 1999). 
Although theoretically the accountability mechanism should be at play in various policy domains, 
most of the available research focuses on economic voting as an important form of accountability 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). Economic considerations tend to be important for most voters 
and, furthermore, incumbents are often held responsible for the state of the economy 
(Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2017; Duch and Stevenson 2008). With regard to other policy 
domains, it has been shown that voters take into account the past performance of the incumbents 
when casting a vote as well (de Vries and Giger 2014). In this analysis, we follow the lead of Van 
der Brug et al. (2007), who suggested that this kind of evaluation should be based on objective 
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economic indicators, as subjective evaluations most likely are biased by the political preferences 
of the voter. 
Second, voters assess to what extent they agree with the objectives of the parties and 
candidates that compete in the elections (Przeworski et al. 1999; Rosema 2007; Lau and Redlawsk 
2006). The idea of voters choosing proximate parties originates in the work of Downs (1957) and 
a large number of studies developing spatial models of voting behavior have substantiated the 
relevance of ideological distance in explaining vote choices (Jessee 2012; Joesten and Stone 2014). 
According to the theoretical literature on representation, a proximity voting mechanism is essential 
for ensuring that elected representatives represent the interests of the citizens (Thomassen and van 
Ham 2014). In principle, proximity rules could relate to positions on a large number of different 
policy issues. Ideology, however, can be considered as an informative summary of parties’ and 
voters’ positions on different issues (Rosema, 2007). Therefore, the left-right dimension can be 
considered a ‘super-issue’ (van der Eijk et al. 2005). Following previous comparative proximity 
voting research, we focus on proximity voting in terms of a left-right dimension. 
Accountability and proximity voting are expected to contribute to democratic 
representation. Both mechanisms require that citizens are sufficiently knowledgeable about 
politics. Although this threshold can, to some extent, be overcome by relying on cognitive short-
cuts, such as partisanship (Lau and Redlawsk 2006), previous research has shown that both 
mechanisms are stronger among the highly politically sophisticated. Political experts engage in 
accountability and proximity voting at a higher level than their less sophisticated peers (Joesten 
and Stone 2014; Singh and Roy 2014). If compulsory voting rules force the low knowledgeable 
voters to vote, it is straightforward to expect that compulsory voting will weaken proximity and 
accountability mechanisms in the vote choice. 
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This review of the literature leads to three hypotheses that will guide us through the 
empirical analysis.  
H1. Compulsory voting reduces education- and knowledge-based stratification of voter turnout. 
H2. Compulsory voting reduces the strength of economic accountability voting. 
H3. Compulsory voting reduces ideologically congruent voting. 
 
Data and Methods 
For testing our hypotheses, we make use of the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES). This project, which now consists of four modules (1996-2016), combines data 
from a large number of national election studies that all include a common set of questions. 
Furthermore, for each of these election samples fieldwork was done shortly after a national 
election, which further increases the validity of the measurements and which is a major advantage 
compared to previous work relying on non-electoral surveys (Nevitte et al. 2002). The CSES 
project covers elections worldwide, but we restrict the analyses to free and fair elections according 
to Freedom House.2 We add to information from the PartiRep 2014 Belgian election study, as 
Belgium is one of the few countries in the world with a strictly enforced system of compulsory 
voting.3  
In this article, we are interested in disentangling the impact of compulsory voting on 
individuals’ probability to vote and on their vote choice. How we operationalize compulsory voting 
is, therefore, of foremost importance. As we already referred to, there is substantial variation in 
forms of compulsory voting and in the extent to which mandatory voting is enforced. We take such 
differences into account in our coding of compulsory voting. We adopt the categorization between 
weakly- and strictly-enforced compulsory voting provided by the Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Our compulsory voting variable can take three values: 0 if voting is 
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voluntary; 1 if voting is compulsory but weakly enforced; and 2 if voting is compulsory and strictly 
enforced. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of elections included in each category and 
includes an overview of the countries that are included in the compulsory-voting categories as well. 
As can be seen from this overview, we can include a fair number of elections that were held under 
strictly enforced compulsory voting rules. For weakly enforced compulsory voting, however, the 
number of elections and – more importantly – the number of countries included is extremely 
limited. As a result, estimates of analyses in which the two categories are coded by means of 
separate dummies are highly unreliable (results available from the authors). We therefore treat the 
compulsory-voting indicator, which runs from 0 to 2, as a continuous indicator. Note, furthermore, 
that an alternative operationalization, distinguishing between strictly enforced compulsory voting 
and any other option (either weakly enforced compulsory voting or voluntary voting) leads to 
essentially the same conclusions as the results reported in this manuscript (results available from 
the authors). In Switzerland, voting is mandatory in Schaffhausen. For the period under analyses, 
it is important to know that there were also forms of compulsory voting in Obwalden until 2012 
and in the canton of St. Gallen until 2009. Voting is voluntary in all other cantons. For reasons of 
consistency, we excluded the limited number of Swiss respondents for whom voting was 
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We first examine the individual-level determinants of turnout. For these analyses, we use 
respondents’ self-reported turnout, which takes the form of a dichotomous variable (coded 1 if a 
voter reported she voted and 0 if she reports abstaining). Self-reported turnout tends to overestimate 
turnout rates. Katosh and Traugott (1981) however, suggest that relying on self-reported turnout is 
not associated with any systematic bias in the results of a statistical analysis. In explaining 
differences in turnout, we focus on the impact of education and political knowledge. For education, 
we distinguish respondents with a college degree from those without a degree. Political knowledge 
is measured by summing the correct answers on three (in CSES modules 1, 2 and 3), four (in CSES 
module 4) or 5 (in the Belgian PartiRep 2014 survey) factual knowledge questions and rescaling 
this sum to a 0 to 1-variable. Respondents’ sum of correct answers was subsequently divided by 
the mean level of correct answers in their election sample. As such, the measure becomes an 
indicator of how knowledgeable a respondent is compared to other respondents in his/her country 
(Dassonneville and Dejaeghere 2014; Singh and Thornton 2013).4 To ascertain that the estimated 
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effects of education and political knowledge are not spurious effects, we control for some important 
correlates of turnout. First, we control for the socio-demographic variables gender, age and income, 
which are all consistently found to affect individuals’ probability of turning out to vote (Smets and 
van Ham 2013). Furthermore, we include a measure of feeling close to a party, because partisans 
are known to turn out to vote at higher rates (Smets and van Ham 2013). We also control citizens’ 
sense of political efficacy5, which is correlated to turnout and our main independent variables of 
interest, education and political knowledge (Banducci and Karp 2009). In addition, our interest in 
the impact of a contextual-level variable – compulsory voting – and the more limited number of 
observations at the contextual level, requires good controls for other systemic differences between 
countries. We thus control for the effective number of parties, the least-squares index of 
disproportionality, and the ideological polarization6 of the party system, which have all been shown 
to be important contextual-level predictors of electoral participation (Geys 2006).  
Next, we investigate how compulsory voting rules affect the quality of the vote choices. 
First, we examine the moderating impact of mandatory voting on accountability voting. For doing 
so, we explain the probability of voting for the lead party. Following Kayser and Peress (2012), we 
operationalize the lead party as the party of the chief executive (i.e. the prime minister in 
parliamentary systems and the president in presidential systems) and estimate its position in a left-
right policy space using the mean position assigned to the party by all respondents. Previous 
research has shown that such mean placements correlate well with other approaches to 
operationalizing parties’ positions, such as expert-placements (Dalton and McAllister 2015). By 
focusing on the lead party only, and not on all parties in the governing coalition, we rely on previous 
work, showing that the attribution of responsibility is directed towards the most clearly identifiable 
governing party – and less so to junior coalition partners (Whitten and Powell 1993), which would 
be in line with previous work on economic voting (Duch and Stevenson 2008).  
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We incorporate indicators of government performance to assess whether accountability 
mechanisms are weakened under compulsory voting. We first investigate the presence of 
accountability mechanisms by estimating the impact of objective economic indicators on voting 
for the lead party. We expect the probability of voting for the lead party to be higher under better 
economic circumstances. We incorporate GDP growth (compared to the previous year) and the 
change in unemployment rates compared to the previous year into our models, as these variables 
are the most regularly used indicators in this line of research (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013).7 
Information for both indicators comes from the World Bank and was measured annually. To take 
into account differences in the timing of the election (i.e., elections in January versus elections in 
December), we used information from the election year as well as the year before and constructed 
a weighted indicator.8 For examining whether accountability mechanisms are weakened under 
compulsory voting, we include terms interacting our indicator of compulsory voting and each of 
the objective economic indicators. 
In a final set of analyses, we assess the impact of compulsory voting rules on the quality of 
the vote choice with regard to ideological proximity. For measuring the ideological position of 
parties, we make use of the mean placement, on a 0 to 10 left-right scale, of all respondents in an 
election sample.9 We first estimate the probability that a voter chooses the ideologically most 
proximate party, and the effect of compulsory voting rules on this probability. Subsequently, we 
investigate in more detail what determines the ideological distance between a voter and the party 
she chooses, and whether compulsory voting rules have a significant impact on this distance. 
For explaining the vote choice (either voting for the lead party or for the most proximate party), 
we take into account a rich literature that argues that socio-demographic characteristics affect the 
vote choice and we control for respondents’ gender, age and their level of education. Furthermore, 
we take into account the impact of partisanship by including a dummy variable, identifying voters 
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who feel close to the lead party (when explaining voting for the lead party) or a dummy 
distinguishing partisans from non-partisans (when focusing on proximity voting). The models 
explaining voting for the lead party additionally include a measure of the ideological distance to 
the lead party – which takes into account that voters generally choose ideologically proximate 
parties (Jessee 2012). The models explaining proximity voting include, besides the socio-
demographic and partisanship, a control for political knowledge – because more knowledgeable 
voters tend to vote for more proximate parties (Joesten and Stone 2014). In addition, we include a 
measure of the ideological extremeness of a voter, because voters who place themselves at the 
extremes on a left-right-scale are less likely to find an ideological party they would consider voting 
for. For identifying the impact of compulsory voting rules in our fairly limited set of countries, it 
is of foremost importance that we control for other systemic differences between countries. 
Therefore, all vote choice models include a series of contextual-level controls (we include the 
effective number of parties, the least squares index of disproportionality and a measure of 
polarization). 
The data have a nested structure, with individual respondents nested in election-years and 
election-years nested in countries. We present a series of mixed models where intercepts and slopes 
are allowed to vary between elections (Hox 2010) to assess the impact (and, separately, the 
moderating effect) of contextual-level variables on individual behavior.10 When explaining turnout, 
voting for the lead party as well as when explaining voting for the proximate party, we present the 
results of mixed logistic regression models. For modeling the ideological distance to the party voted 
for, we present the results of a mixed linear model. We also verify whether the results are robust 
to taking into account overdispersion in this dependent variable (see Appendix B). Given the 
limited number of compulsory voting countries in our dataset, we verify the impact of influential 





We first investigate whether, in line with most previous studies, we can confirm that inequalities 
in voting are reduced when turnout is mandatory (Singh 2015). These analyses of the impact of 
education- and political knowledge-based stratification serve as a test for the argument made by 
advocates of compulsory voting that the better-educated and more knowledgeable turn out to vote 
under a voluntary voting regime. 
In Model 1, we only include the main effects (Table 2). We are mainly interested in the 
effect of compulsory voting laws on the probability of a respondent turning out to vote. Not 
surprisingly, the effect is positive and significant, confirming that citizens living in countries where 
voting is mandatory are more likely to vote. Furthermore, it can be confirmed that both educational 
attainment and political knowledge serve as a stratification mechanism between who turns out to 















THE EFFECT OF COMPULSORY VOTING IN TURNOUT 








Female 0.089*** 0.085*** 0.102*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.143*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
College education 0.363*** 0.447*** 0.348*** 
 (0.026) (0.051) (0.026) 
Political knowledge 0.553*** 0.553*** 0.652*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.040) 
Party ID 0.969*** 0.969*** 0.961*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political efficacy 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.255*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ENEP -0.061 -0.069 -0.070 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Least squares index -0.029 -0.025 -0.015 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) 
Polarization -0.037 -0.044 -0.051 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) 0.697*** 0.741*** 0.914*** 
 (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) 
CV x college education  -0.228**  
  (0.073)  
CV x political knowledge   -0.338*** 
   (0.046) 
Constant -0.860** -0.832** -0.912** 
 (0.281) (0.281) (0.283) 
σ2election-years 0.736 0.738 0.750 
σ2slope  0.144 0.483 
N respondents 132,262 132,262 132,262 
N election-years 113 113 113 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept and random slope logistic 
regression models explaining turnout. Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded 
from the analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly 
enforced) as well were excluded from the analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001.  




In Model 2 we add an interaction between compulsory voting (measured on a scale from 0 
to 2) and having a college degree. Doing so allows us to verify whether the educational stratification 
between voting and abstaining is reduced when voting is compulsory. As evident from the results, 
the interaction term is indeed negative and significant. To ease the interpretation of this interaction 
effect, however, we present the marginal effects of having a college degree on the probability of 
turning out to vote for different operationalizations of compulsory voting rules. As is clear from 
Figure 1, the marginal effect of having a college degree is significantly reduced when voting is 
weakly enforced, and even more strongly so in a context of strictly enforced compulsory voting. 
These results confirm that there is less stratification based on education when voting is compulsory. 
 
FIGURE 1. 
THE EFFECT OF HAVING A COLLEGE DEGREE ON TURNING OUT TO VOTE, FOR VARYING COMPULSORY 
VOTING RULES 
 
Notes: Marginal effect of having a college degree. Obtained from 10,000 simulated observations, using the estimates 
of Model 2 in Table 2. All other covariates set at the sample mean. 
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In a final model (Model 3 in Table 2), we add an interaction between compulsory voting 
and political knowledge, allowing us to verify whether knowledge-based stratifications in turnout 
are reduced under mandatory voting. In line with what we observe for educational attainment, the 
effect is negative and significant, suggesting that the effect of knowledge on turnout is reduced 
when citizens are compelled to vote. The marginal effects in Figure 2 further clarify this interaction 
effect. We observe a strong impact of political knowledge on the probability of turning out to vote 
when voting is voluntary; this impact is weaker in contexts where voting is mandatory. 
FIGURE 2. 
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE ON TURNING OUT TO VOTE, FOR VARYING COMPULSORY VOTING 
RULES 
 
Notes: Marginal effect of political knowledge. Obtained from 10,000 simulated observations, using the estimates of 
Model 3 in Table 2. All other covariates set at the sample mean. 
The analyses presented in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 support our first hypothesis. 
Compulsory voting rules significantly reduce education- and political knowledge-based 
stratification in turnout. This observation has led proponents of voluntary voting systems to claim 
that the votes that are cast under such rules are – on average – better informed votes, and therefore 
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higher quality votes (Brennan and Hill 2014; Selb and Lachat 2009). We empirically test the 
validity of this claim by means of analyses of the accountability and proximity-mechanisms 
guiding the vote choice.  
For examining whether the accountability-function of elections is diluted when voting is 
mandatory, we examine in Table 3 what explains voting for the lead party. We expect the 
probability of voting for the lead party to be higher in a context of high levels of GDP growth and 
to be lower when unemployment rates increased more strongly. The results of Model 1 confirm 
that GDP growth rates are significantly and positively related to the probability of voting for the 
lead party. The effect is rather weak, and only significant at p<0.05, but in terms of the size it is in 
line with previous research on this relation (Kayser and Peress 2012). From the results of Model 3 
it can be observed that changes in unemployment rates significantly affect the odds of voting for 
the lead party as well. A stronger increase in unemployment rates reduces the probability that voters 
vote for the lead party. We further note that the main effect of compulsory voting on choosing the 














EXPLAINING VOTING FOR THE LEAD PARTY 










Female 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
College education -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Lead party ID 3.738*** 3.738*** 3.740*** 3.739*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Ideological distance to lead party -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.501*** -0.501*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
ENEP -0.174*** -0.172*** -0.162*** -0.161*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Least squares index 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Polarization 0.026 0.023 0.047 0.050 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) -0.285* -0.089 -0.212 -0.217 
 (0.118) (0.201) (0.115) (0.114) 
GDP growth rate 0.081* 0.104**   
 (0.032) (0.038)   
Δ unemployment rate   -0.173* -0.140 
   (0.072) (0.078) 
CV x GDP growth  -0.052   
  (0.044)   
CV x Δ unemployment rate    -0.103 
    (0.102) 
Constant 0.336 0.282 0.338 0.330 
 (0.285) (0.286) (0.282) (0.280) 
σ2election-years 0.623 0.615 0.610 0.604 
N respondents 108,651 108,651 108,335 108,335 
N election-years 107 107 106 106 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept logistic regression models 
explaining voting for the lead party. Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded from 
the analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly enforced) as 
well were excluded from the analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  





The results of Model 1 and Model 3 offer some indication that accountability-mechanisms 
affect the vote choice. Model 2 and Model 4 allow testing whether this accountability-mechanism 
is weakened under compulsory voting rules. To this end, we add an interaction term between 
compulsory voting and GDP growth in Model 2 and an interaction between compulsory voting 
rules and the change in unemployment rates in Model 4. The estimates in Model 2 offer no 
indication that compulsory voting rules significantly weaken the effect of GDP growth rates. 
Furthermore, the results in Model 4 give no indications of a significant interaction effect with 
changes in unemployment rates either. To gain insights in these interaction effects, however, we 
also plot in Figure 3 the marginal effect of GDP growth (left panel) and of the change in 
unemployment rate (right panel) on voting for the lead party. The plot shows a significant marginal 
effect of GDP growth on voting for the lead party in voluntary voting systems only. However, and 
importantly, the figure also shows no significant differences in the impact of GDP growth between 
the three categories of voting rules. For changes in unemployment rates as well, the plot clarifies 
that there are no significant differences in impact between the three forms of compulsory voting 
rules. The conclusion of our analyses of accountability mechanisms, thus, has to be that the extent 
to which voters hold incumbents accountable for the state of the economy does not vary 
significantly with different compulsory voting rules. We find no evidence confirming our second 
hypothesis. Accountability mechanisms are not weakened significantly when voting is mandatory, 











THE EFFECT OF GDP GROWTH RATE AND Δ UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ON VOTING FOR THE LEAD PARTY, FOR 
VARYING COMPULSORY VOTING RULES 
 
Notes: Marginal effect of a one unit increase in GDP growth rate (left panel) or Δ unemployment rate (right panel). 
Obtained from 10,000 simulated observations, using the estimates of Model 2 and Model 4 in Table 3. All other 
variables are set at the sample mean. 
 
Next, we investigate whether the same holds for ideological proximity (Table 4). In a first 
model, we present the results of a mixed linear model explaining the ideological distance between 
a voter and the party she voted for. Female and older voters are significantly more distant from 
their party. Not surprisingly, being higher educated and being more knowledgeable reduce the 
ideological distance between voter and party. Additionally, it appears that being close to a party 
serves as a useful heuristic for choosing a proximate party, as the ideological distance to the party 
of choice is significantly smaller for those who feel close to a party. Finally, it can be observed that 
for voters who place themselves closer to the extremes of the left-right scale, the ideological 
distance to the party voted for is significantly larger. Looking at the effect of the macro-level 
variables, it can be observed that a more polarized party system significantly reduces the distance 
to the party of choice.11 It thus seems that choosing a party in a system where parties are more 
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polarized, and thus also more clearly distinct ideologically, allows for closer connections on 
average between voters and the parties they choose (Lupu 2015). Finally, and most importantly, 
we observe a significant impact of compulsory voting rules on the ideological distance between a 
voter and her party. The effect is positive and significant, implying that voters in systems with 























THE EFFECT OF COMPULSORY VOTING RULES ON PROXIMITY VOTING 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Ideological distance to the 
party of choice 







Female 0.044*** -0.040** 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
Age 0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
College education -0.162*** 0.143*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) 
Political knowledge -0.131*** 0.124*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) 
Party ID -0.227*** 0.217*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) 
Extremeness left-right placement 0.340*** 0.255*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
ENEP -0.031* -0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.026) 
Least squares index 0.010 0.025* 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
Polarization -0.049*** 0.027 
 (0.011) (0.020) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) 0.131*** -0.152* 
 (0.040) (0.071) 
Constant 1.394*** -1.185*** 
 (0.086) (0.154) 
σ2election-years 0.058 0.186 
N respondents 98,403 98,403 
N election-years 101 101 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept linear regression model 
explaining the ideological distance to the party of choice (Model 1) and logistic regression model 
explaining voting for the most proximate party (Model 2). Election samples with less than 400 
observations were excluded from the analyses. Election samples with less than 400 observations were 
excluded from the analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly 
enforced) as well were excluded from the analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001.  




The ideological distance between a voter and the party she chooses, however, is not 
determined only by the choices that a voter makes. To a large extent, whether or not a voter can 
vote for an ideologically proximate party depends on the options she has, and thus on the supply 
side. A more direct test of voters’ capacities of choosing a party that matches well with their 
opinions hence consists of an analysis the extent to which they choose the most proximate party, 
given the options available. In Model 2 we estimate a mixed logit model examining the 
determinants of choosing the most ideologically proximate party. The results in Table 4 show that 
higher educated, more knowledgeable voters, voters with a party identification, as well as more 
extreme voters are more likely to vote for the party that is closest to them. It can further be noted 
that the probability of choosing the most proximate party is significantly reduced as there are more 
parties in a party system. Under this somewhat stricter test as well, we find indications that 
compulsory voting rules weaken proximity voting. That is, we find a negative and significant (at 
p<0.05) effect of compulsory voting rules on the probability of choosing the most proximate party. 
This estimated effect is somewhat uncertain, however. When constructing a measure of parties’ 
left-right placement that is based on the position attributed to parties by respondents with a college 
degree only (cfr. Singh and Thornton 2013) and re-estimating this model, we find that this effect 
is still negative but falls short of statistical significance (full results can be consulted in Appendix 
A). Nevertheless, the fact that the estimate is consistently found to be negative, and the fact that it 
ties in with the results of Model 1 allow concluding that proximity voting appears to be weakened 
when citizens are compelled to turn out to vote. 
 
Conclusion 
With the current paper, our aim was to test the often repeated argument that systems of compulsory 
voting might be associated with higher turnout, but that exactly because they entice the least 
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knowledgeable citizens to vote, they have a detrimental effect on the quality of electoral 
representation. 
First, our analyses confirm previous findings: systems of compulsory voting diminish 
stratification based on political knowledge or level of education, as is indicated by the negative 
interaction of compulsory voting and education on turnout.12 Given the ongoing concerns about 
the representation of groups with a lower socio-economic status in the political decision making 
process (Schlozmann et al. 2012), this is an important finding as it confirms that government 
intervention can mitigate this form of stratification. This finding is in line with previous studies 
(Singh 2015), and it leads to an even sharper dilemma: if these less knowledgeable citizens turn 
out to vote, should we be worried about the quality of their electoral decision making process? It 
is indeed widely assumed that voters need these cognitive resources, both to make an adequate 
judgment about the past performance of politicians, and to identify the political party that is closest 
to their own ideological preference. Nevertheless, we observe that accountability mechanisms are 
equally strong in countries with a system of compulsory voting. Only for proximity voting are there 
indications of a negative impact of compulsory voting rules. 
This apparent paradox could be solved in a number of ways. First, it might be assumed that 
given the obligation to vote, the least knowledgeable will be forced to pay at least some attention 
to the electoral campaign, as they know they will have to make a vote choice. Second, an alternative 
suggestion might be that maybe it does not require only a specific level political sophistication to 
arrive at a judgment about economic performance. Based on previous research, the most 
sophisticated are better equipped to assess the economic situation, but the margin of error 
apparently does not inhibit voters from arriving at the same conclusion of accountability. For 
proximity voting, we did find that the mechanism is weakened in a context of mandatory voting. 
Traditionally, retrospective voting is effectively considered a less demanding way of voting 
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compared to what spatial and proximity models of voting require (Key 1966). Consequently, when 
it comes to holding incumbents into account, compulsory voting rules do not imply a loss of 
strength of this mechanism. Proximity voting, which is a somewhat more challenging exercise, by 
contrast, is becoming a less effective vote choice determinant when compulsory voting rules are in 
place—and when the electorate overall is somewhat less informed. 
In the theoretical literature on the role of elections, two main mechanisms are thought of as 
important in realizing democratic representation; accountability and proximity voting. Our results 
indicate that only one of those two mechanisms is weakened when citizens are compelled to vote, 
that is, when mandatory voting rules are in place. We do not wish to make claims about which of 
both mechanisms is the most important one, and that is a largely normative discussion. We do, 
however, wish to bring more nuance in the debate on the implications of compulsory voting rules. 
We know already from previous research that compulsory voting should not be considered as a 
panacea solution to give equal voice to everyone in the population. The counter-argument that 
compulsory voting would erode the representative function of elections, however, receives only 
mixed support here. While we can confirm that proximity voting is weakened under compulsory 
voting, the same does not hold for the mechanism of accountability. Previous work on the quality 
of the vote choice and on the impact of compulsory voting rules thereon, has not accounted for the 
importance of the accountability mechanism. Doing so, we show, makes for a somewhat more 
balanced view on the consequences of compelling (in particular low knowledgeable) citizens to 
turn out to vote. A number of over-time changes in voting behavior furthermore render 
accountability an increasingly important vote choice determinant. Left-right identifications are 
becoming less important vote choice factors among younger generations of voters (Walczak et al. 
2012). In addition, it has been claimed that a trend towards dealignment implies performance 
evaluations are becoming increasingly important (Kayser and Wlezien 2011). If accountability 
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mechanisms are effectively becoming increasing important in determining the vote choices of 
citizens, the implication of our results is that differences in the ‘quality’ of the vote choice in 
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1 . Due to missing information on some of the variables, the sample sizes differ somewhat from 
one analysis to another. Full information on what samples are included in each of the analyses and 
reasons for non-inclusion are included in Appendix E of the online appendix. 
2. We exclude cases where Freedom House rated political rights above 5 (on a 7-point scale where 
7 indicates “few or no political rights because of severe government oppression”). This excludes 
Belarus in 2001 and 2008, Kyrgyzstan in 2005, Thailand in 2007, and Russia in 2004. 
3. For a number of control variables, the question wording in the Belgian election study differed 
from the CSES-question format (e.g., income, efficacy, and political knowledge). For 
comparability, the scales of these variables were standardized so they match the metrics of the 
CSES questions. The Belgian 2014 elections are not included in the accountability-analysis, as the 
data did not allow operationalizing the direction of partisanship. 
4. All knowledge items were closed-ended questions, and not answering a question was treated as 
an incorrect response. For CSES modules 1 to 3 holds that national survey teams were instructed 
to design knowledge questions that would be answered correctly by two-thirds, one-half and one-
third of the respondents respectively. Surveys in module 4 of CSES by contrast included the same 
four – general – knowledge questions. Finally, the Belgian survey included five knowledge 
questions. We verified the robustness of the result when relying on a single standardized approach 
to measuring political knowledge, that is, the approach implemented in Modules 1 to 3 of CSES. 
The results of these additional analyses are available from the authors and lead to substantially the 
same conclusions. 
5. Based on a standardized scale of the items ‘who is in power makes a difference’ and ‘who people 




included, the measure is based on a single question. For Belgium, the standardized scale of seven 
political efficacy questions was used. 
6. The effective number of parties (ENEP), measured in votes, and the least squares index of 
disproportionality come from Gallagher’s website or were updated by the authors. For mixed 
systems, calculations are based on the party list tier only. We implemented the formula used by 
Lupu (2015) to calculate polarization within CSES. The exact formula is P = ∑ 𝜔𝑗(𝑝𝑗 − ?́?)
2𝑛
𝑗=1 , 
where ωj is the share of the vote received by party j, pj is the position of party j on the left-right 
scale, and ?́?is the average position of the parties.   
7. In operationalizing these variable, we thus take into account change over the last year and not 
e.g., change over the full electoral cycle. This way of operationalizing the econmic indicators is in 
line with a rich literature that indicates that voters are myopic and consider especially the state of 
the economy in the most recent period when evaluating the performance of incumbents (Achen and 
Bartels, 2016; Wlezien, 2015).  
8. Following the formula proposed by Bélanger and Gélineau (2010, 98): 
ρ=[ρ(t−1)*(12−σ(t))/12]+[ρ(t)*(σ(t)/12], where ρ is the annual economic indicator, σ is the election 
month and t is the election year. 
 
9. We also verified whether results are robust to estimating parties position based on the assessment 
of highly educated respondents only. The results of these analyses are reported in Appendix A and 
are in line with the main results reported in the manuscript. 
10. We opted for a two-level model, because in a number of countries only one election was 
included, which would invalidate a three-level design (Singh, 2015). 
11. Descriptive statistics for these macro-level variables by country are included in Appendix C. 
12. It should be noted here that in our analysis compulsory does not diminish this form of 
stratification because it strengthens levels of political knowledge. In a separate analysis, we did not 





APPENDIX A.  




EXPLAINING VOTING FOR THE LEAD PARTY 










Female 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
College education -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.163*** -0.163*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Lead party ID 3.721*** 3.721*** 3.723*** 3.723*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Ideological distance to lead party -0.509*** -0.509*** -0.514*** -0.514*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
ENEP -0.181*** -0.180*** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Least squares index 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Polarization 0.014 0.010 0.035 0.038 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) -0.308** -0.099 -0.233* -0.238* 
 (0.119) (0.202) (0.116) (0.115) 
GDP growth rate 0.083* 0.108**   
 (0.033) (0.038)   
Δ unemployment rate   -0.185* -0.157* 
   (0.072) (0.079) 
CV x GDP growth  -0.056   
  (0.044)   
CV x Δ unemployment rate    -0.088 
    (0.102) 
Constant 0.450 0.392 0.459 0.453 
 (0.287) (0.288) (0.284) (0.283) 
σ2election-years 0.634 0.624 0.619 0.615 
N respondents 108651 108651 108335 108335 
N election-years 107 107 106 106 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept logistic regression models explaining 
voting for the lead party. Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded from the analyses. Voters 
living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly enforced) as well were excluded from the 
analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 2. 
THE EFFECT OF COMPULSORY VOTING RULES ON PROXIMITY VOTING 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Ideological distance to the 
party of choice 







Female 0.040*** -0.024 
 (0.008) (0.015) 
Age 0.002*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
College education -0.202*** 0.145*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) 
Political knowledge -0.158*** 0.120*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) 
Party ID -0.254*** 0.219*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) 
Extremeness left-right placement 0.270*** 0.230*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
ENEP -0.025 -0.099*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) 
Least squares index 0.010 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Polarization -0.054*** 0.041 
 (0.013) (0.021) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) 0.122** -0.065 
 (0.044) (0.075) 
Constant 1.627*** -1.254*** 
 (0.095) (0.162) 
σ2election-years 0.071 0.207 
N observations 98,403 98,403 
N election-years 101 101 
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept linear regression model explaining the 
ideological distance to the party of choice (Model 1) and logistic regression model explaining voting for the most 
proximate party (Model 2). Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded from the analyses. 
Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded from the analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons 
where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly enforced) as well were excluded from the analyses. Significance 
levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 









EXPLAINING DISTANCE TO THE PARTY OF CHOICE – ACCOUNTING FOR OVERDISPERSION 
 
The dependent variable for the analysis of the distance to the party vote for varies between 0 and 10, but 
most voters choose a party that is fairly close to them ideologically. As a result, the variable is not normally 
distributed. Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which there is overdispersion in the distance to the party of 
choice. The mean ideological distance is 1.60, with a standard deviation of 1.33. The variance of the 
variable is 1.77. 
 
FIGURE 1. 
DISTRIBUTION OF DISTANCE TO THE PARTY OF CHOICE 
  
 
Given the non-normal distribution of the dependent variable, a linear specification might be inappropriate. 
Additionally, the distance variable is bound and cannot be smaller than zero (King, 1988). For taking these 
properties into account, assuming a poisson or negative binominal distribution are possible alternative 
modeling options. Given that the variance of the dependent variable (1.78) does not differ strongly from 
the mean value (1.60) we consider a poisson distribution an appropriate alternative. In Table 1 we verify 
whether the main results presented in our manuscript (Model 1 in Table 3) are sensitive to such an 
alternative model specification.  Comparing the estimates of both modeling approaches clarifies that the 







EXPLAINING THE DISTANCE TO THE PARTY VOTED FOR – MIXED POISSON MODEL 
 Model 1 








College education -0.093*** 
 (0.006) 
Political knowledge -0.168*** 
 (0.008) 
Party ID -0.134*** 
 (0.005) 













N observations 98,403 
N election-years 101 
Notes: Unstandardized errors and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept poisson regression model 
explaining the ideological distance to the party of choice (Model 2). Election samples with less than 400 
observations were excluded from the analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak 
or strictly enforced) as well were excluded from the analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
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APPENDIX C. 
















Germany 2013 1.24 21.12 0 4.81 7.83 2.69 
Germany 2009 1.24 30.05 0 5.58 3.4 3.32 
Spain 2008 1.24 38.38 0 2.79 4.49 5.94 
Norway 2001 1.25 36.03 0 6.18 3.31 3.62 
Norway 2013 1.25 36.2 0 4.87 2.56 5.52 
Netherlands 2002 1.26 26.1 0 6.04 .88 3.44 
Netherlands 1998 1.27 26.1 0 5.15 1.28 2.07 
Sweden 2014 1.27 21.74 0 5.41 2.64 4.78 
Norway 2009 1.28 36.82 0 4.55 3.01 5.59 
Netherlands 2006 1.3 19.23 0 5.8 1.03 3.51 
Iceland 2007 1.31 48.37 0 4.06 3.49 4.78 
Finland 2003 1.31 28.05 0 5.65 3.16 2.07 
Iceland 2013 1.31 36.53 0 5.83 6.23 4.35 
Czech Republic 2010 1.31 41.98 0 6.75 8.76 6.51 
Norway 2005 1.31 25.71 0 5.11 2.67 5.06 
Sweden 2006 1.31 17.81 0 4.66 3.02 5.44 
Czech Republic 2002 1.32 60.98 0 4.82 5.73 8.04 
Norway 1997 1.32 34.51 0 4.94 3.44 2.98 
Australia 1996 1.33 17.79 2 3.21 10.97 1.1 
Spain 2004 1.34 41.51 0 3 4.25 5.25 
Spain 2000 1.37 43.45 0 3.12 6.1 3.14 
Czech Republic 2006 1.37 55.91 0 3.91 5.72 8.61 
Denmark 2007 1.38 22.94 0 5.41 .72 4.07 
Finland 2007 1.39 27.67 0 5.88 3.2 3.32 
Finland 2011 1.4 24.3 0 6.47 2.95 2.99 
New Zealand 2008 1.4 20 0 3.07 3.84 2.95 
Belgium (Flanders ) 2014 1.41 15.56 2 5.05 5.05 1.89 
Iceland 2009 1.41 33.55 0 4.55 2.58 4.37 
New Zealand 1996 1.42 23.82 0 4.27 3.43 3.68 
Canada 2008 1.43 35.97 0 3.87 10.09 2.57 
Great Britain 2005 1.43 41.94 0 3.59 16.73 1.33 
Sweden 2002 1.44 35.48 0 4.51 1.52 5.26 
Czech Republic 1996 1.44 41.07 0 5.33 5.55 7.47 
Switzerland 2011 1.44 34.64 0 6.35 3.76 4.22 
Czech Republic 2013 1.44 37.48 0 7.61 6.12 6.06 
Sweden 1998 1.44 46.33 0 4.55 .97 6.76 
Netherlands 2010 1.45 22.86 0 6.97 .81 4.15 
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Switzerland 1999 1.45 31.8 0 5.87 3.17 2.59 
Portugal 2002 1.45 42.9 0 3.03 4.64 5.61 
Canada 1997 1.45 33.23 0 4.09 13.26 .983 
Canada 2004 1.46 39.84 0 3.78 9.81 1.25 
Switzerland 2007 1.47 29.86 0 5.61 2.56 4.07 
New Zealand 2002 1.47 22.22 0 4.17 2.37 2.35 
Germany 1998 1.47 27.51 0 3.78 3.15 1.7 
France 2007 1.47 39.91 0 4.32 13.58 6.19 
New Zealand 2011 1.48 27.56 0 3.15 2.38 4.13 
Belgium (Flanders) 1999 1.48 18.89 2 10.28 2.99 1.37 
Taiwan 2001 1.48 19.19 0 3.57 4.12 .328 
Bulgaria 2014 1.48 35.15 0 5.77 2.52 5.77 
Canada 2011 1.49 30.12 0 3.43 12.42 3.15 
Australia 2007 1.49 50.19 2 3.03 10.27 1.56 
Australia 2004 1.51 32.84 2 3.17 8.6 2.04 
Germany 2005 1.51 27.71 0 4.46 2.16 2.49 
Switzerland 2003 1.52 39.26 0 5.44 2.47 4.32 
Greece 2009 1.52 43.9 1 3.16 7.29 3.84 
Great Britain 1997 1.53 54.32 0 3.22 16.51 1.94 
Israel 2003 1.53 25.23 0 7.05 2.53 3.92 
Germany 2002 1.56 26.3 0 4.09 4.61 2.92 
Austria 2013 1.58 17.12 0 5.15 3.31 2.08 
Portugal 2009 1.59 48.34 0 3.83 5.63 2.94 
Australia 2013 1.6 47.22 2 4.26 9.54 1.9 
Israel 2013 1.6 29.11 0 8.68 3.09 1.61 
Greece 2012 1.6 26.65 1 8.95 12.88 5.39 
Hong Kong 1998 1.61 24.94 0 3.75 6.63 .617 
Belgium (Wallonia) 2014 1.63 16.19 2 5.05 8.49 1.72 
Portugal 2005 1.65 43.71 0 3.13 5.75 3.16 
Hungary 1998 1.65 28.04 0 5.18 10.88 3.16 
Ireland 2002 1.65 29.67 0 4.13 6.62 1.68 
Turkey 2015 1.66 35.7 2 3.13 3.65 9.82 
Portugal 2015 1.69 44.87 0 2.89 3.59 6.98 
Estonia 2011 1.69 29.36 0 4.78 5.09 4.36 
Israel 2006 1.72 32.24 0 8.98 2.49 1.26 
Spain 1996 1.73 30.33 0 3.21 5.36 4.22 
Mexico 2015 1.77 33.67 1 4.14 5.65 3.29 
Slovenia 2011 1.77 27.47 0 5.57 3.64 3.96 
United States 2004 1.78 55.66 0 2.18 2.99 1.81 
Slovakia 2010 1.78 37.06 0 5.53 7.46 3.95 
Poland 1997 1.78 45.99 0 4.59 10.63 6.87 
South Korea 2008 1.81 23.4 0 4.28 5.13 3 
Poland 2007 1.81 38.33 0 3.32 4.67 3.17 
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Croatia 2007 1.84 21.14 0 4.23 7.58 5.73 
South Korea 2004 1.85 24.91 0 3.36 12.11 3.21 
Poland 2005 1.87 32.87 0 5.86 6.97 4.5 
Poland 2001 1.88 32.91 0 4.5 6.33 8.44 
Hungary 2002 1.89 41.09 0 2.94 8.2 11 
Austria 2008 1.91 14.01 0 4.79 2.92 3.91 
Mexico 2009 1.96 29.72 1 3.77 10.46 4.45 
Poland  1.97 45.01 0 10.46 30.21 11.8 
Poland 2011 1.99 33.74 0 3.74 5.95 2.92 
Peru 2011 2.03 22.96 2 5.71 10.23 1.69 
United States 2008 2.1 59.47 0 2.09 4.01 .047 
Mexico 2006 2.14 76.21 1 3.42 6.34 2.98 
Peru 2006 2.15 25.76 2 7.31 13.95 .75 
Mexico 2012 2.16 31.84 1 3.16 6.87 3.28 
United States 2012 2.19 57.2 0 2.13 4.79 .084 
Serbia 2012 2.27 33.43 0 6.32 6.53 .335 
South Africa 2009 2.32 49.81 0 2.13 .3 4.49 
Brazil 2002 2.8 20.5 2 9.28 3.07 .78 
Mexico 2000 2.8 36.34 1 3 6.7 3.49 
Mexico 1997 2.81 26.77 1 3.42 6.77 1.51 
Mexico 2003 2.91 33.42 1 3.19 4.74 2.04 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample of Model 1 in Table 3 in the main manuscript. N = 98,403. 





SENSITIVITY TO INFLUENTIAL CASES (ELECTION-SAMPLES) 
 
The main variables of interest in our analyses are upper-level variables (i.e., compulsory voting and 
economic indicators), which are based on a relatively low number of observations (elections). When 
interpreting the results of our analyses, we have to be aware of the fact that estimates of these analyses are 
sensitive to influential cases. To detect influential cases and their impact on the result, we follow the advice 
by van der Meer et al. (2010). We first perform diagnostic tests, calculating Cook’s D and DFBETAS and 
subsequently estimate the models with additional election-dummies for the most influential cases we 
identified. 
 
The Cook’s D statistic is a measure of the influence of one case (for our analyses, an election) on all level-
2 estimates. DFBETAS offer a measure of the influence of one case on different estimates separately. We 
focus here on the DFBETAS for the estimates of interest; the interaction between compulsory voting and 
GDP growth in the accountability analyses and compulsory voting in the proximity analyses. The results 
reported here confirm that the direction and significance level of these indicators is robust to excluding the 




DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS – TURNOUT (INTERACTION CV X POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE) 
Election Cook’s D DFBETA 
Albania 2005 0.673  
Poland 2005 0.438  
Mexico 2012 0.357  
Mexico 2012  -1.556 
Brazil 2011  1.100 
Poland 2005  0.780 
Notes: Diagnostic statistics via mltcooksd-ado in Stata (Möhring and Schmidt, 2013). Cases with highest values for 
each of the diagnostic statistics are reported. 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
 
TABLE 2. 
DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS – TURNOUT (INTERACTION CV X COLLEGE EDUCATION) 
Election Cook’s D DFBETA 
Albania 2005 0.646  
Mexico 2012 0.368  
Poland 2005 0.339  
Greece 2012  0.896 
Brazil 2002  0.613 
Peru 2011  -0.600 
Notes: Diagnostic statistics via mltcooksd-ado in Stata (Möhring and Schmidt, 2013). Cases with highest values for 
each of the diagnostic statistics are reported. 




EXPLAINING TURNOUT – CONTROLLING FOR THE IMPACT OF OUTLIERS 










Female 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Political knowledge 0.727*** 0.726*** 0.553*** 0.553*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) 
College education 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.051) (0.051) 
Income 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Political efficacy 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Party ID 0.961*** 0.961*** 0.969*** 0.969*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ENEP -0.133** -0.062 -0.129** -0.056 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) 
Least squares index -0.083** -0.023 -0.075** -0.026 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) 
Polarization -0.089* -0.041 -0.083* -0.044 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) 1.014*** 0.923*** 0.815*** 0.773*** 
 (0.129) (0.135) (0.123) (0.131) 
CV x political knowledge -0.283*** -0.283***   
 (0.055) (0.055)   
CV x college education   -0.227** -0.228** 
   (0.073) (0.073) 
Constant -0.176 -0.962*** -0.161 -0.889** 
 (0.343) (0.292) (0.331) (0.286) 
σ2election-years 0.677 0.773 0.648 0.723 
σ2slope 0.105 0.103 0.145 0.145 
N respondents 132,262 132,262 132,262 132,262 
N election-years 113 113 113 113 
Note: Unstandardized errors and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept logistic regression models 
explaining turnout. Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded from the analyses. Voters living 
in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly enforced) as well were excluded from the analyses. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Model 1 includes election dummies for Albania 2005, 
Poland 2005 and Mexico 2012. Model 2 includes election dummies for Mexico 2012, Brazil 2011 and Poland 2005. 
Model 3 includes election dummies for Albania 2005, Poland 2005 and Mexico 2012. Model 4 includes election 
dummies for Greece 2012, Brazil 2002 and Peru 2011. 
Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 4. 
DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS – VOTING FOR THE LEAD PARTY (FOCUS ON GDP) 
Election Cook’s D DFBETA 
Sweden 2014 0.995  
Mexico 1997 0.285  
New Zealand 1996 0.242  
Chile 2009  1.190 
Peru 2011  -0.824 
Peru 2006  -0.527 
Notes: Diagnostic statistics via mltcooksd-ado in Stata (Möhring and Schmidt, 2013). Cases with highest values for 
each of the diagnostic statistics are reported. 




DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS – VOTING FOR THE LEAD PARTY (FOCUS ON UNEMPLOYMENT) 
Election Cook’s D DFBETA 
Sweden 2014 0.989  
Mexico 1997 0.292  
Brazil 2002 0.248  
Chile 2009  -0.786 
Brazil 2002  0.759 
Poland 2007  -0.467 
Critical value 0.037 0.193 
Notes: Diagnostic statistics via mltcooksd-ado in Stata (Möhring and Schmidt, 2013). Cases with highest values for 
each of the diagnostic statistics are reported. 























VOTING FOR THE LEAD PARTY – CONTROLLING FOR THE IMPACT OF OUTLIERS 










Female 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
College education -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Lead party ID 3.738*** 3.736*** 3.740*** 3.740*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Ideological distance to lead party -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.501*** -0.501*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP growth rate 0.101** 0.101**   
 (0.038) (0.035)   
ENEP -0.169*** -0.150*** -0.195*** -0.207*** 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.047) (0.046) 
Least squares index 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.011 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Polarization 0.026 0.014 0.064 0.059 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) -0.093 -0.014 -0.316** -0.309* 
 (0.200) (0.227) (0.116) (0.130) 
CV x GDP growth -0.052 -0.021   
 (0.044) (0.052)   
Δ unemployment rate   -0.133 -0.213** 
   (0.076) (0.081) 
CV x Δ unemployment rate   -0.171 -0.111 
   (0.102) (0.158) 
Constant 0.269 0.168 0.428 0.506 
 (0.286) (0.267) (0.275) (0.270) 
σ2election-years 0.610 0.525 0.561 0.537 
N respondents 108,651 108,651 108,335 108,335 
N election-years 107 107 106 106 
Notes: Unstandardized errors and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept logistic regression models 
explaining voting for the lead party. Election samples with less than 400 observations were excluded from the 
analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly enforced) as well were 
excluded from the analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Model 1 includes election 
dummies for Sweden 2014, Mexico 1997 and New Zealand 1996. Model 2 includes election dummies for Chile 
2009, Peru 2011 and Peru 2006. Model 3 includes election dummies for Sweden 2014, Mexico 1997 and Brazil 
2002. Model 4 includes election dummies for Chile 2009, Brazil 2002 and Poland 2007. 




DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS – DISTANCE TO THE PARTY VOTED FOR 
Election Cook’s D DFBETA 
Mexico 1997 1.454  
Peru 2006 0.873  
Hungary 2002 0.840  
Brazil 2002  0.817 
Australia 1996  -0.489 
Belgium (Flanders) 2014  -0.400 
Notes: Diagnostic statistics via mltcooksd-ado in Stata (Möhring and Schmidt, 2013). Cases with highest values for 
each of the diagnostic statistics are reported. 




DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS – VOTING FOR THE CLOSEST PARTY 
Election Cook’s D DFBETA 
Portugal 2005 1.121  
New Zealand 1996 0.504  
Switzerland 2011 0.437  
Australia 2007  0.483 
Australia 2013  0.402 
Australia 1996  -0.361 
Notes: Diagnostic statistics via mltcooksd-ado in Stata (Möhring and Schmidt, 2013). Cases with highest values for 
each of the diagnostic statistics are reported. 






















VOTING FOR THE CLOSEST PARTY – CONTROLLING FOR THE IMPACT OF OUTLIERS 



























Female 0.044*** 0.044*** -0.040** -0.040** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
College education -0.162*** -0.162*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) 
Political knowledge -0.131*** -0.132*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Party ID -0.227*** -0.227*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) 
Extremeness left-right 
placement 
0.340*** 0.340*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
ENEP -0.025 -0.046*** -0.116*** -0.110*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.025) 
Least squares index 0.008 0.012* 0.024* 0.024* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Polarization -0.054*** -0.048*** 0.027 0.028 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) 
Compulsory voting (0-2) 0.112** 0.134*** -0.151* -0.199** 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.070) (0.074) 
Constant 1.382*** 1.446*** -1.181*** -1.203*** 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.154) (0.148) 
σ2election-years 0.048 0.046 0.182 0.167 
N respondents 98,403 98,403 98,403 98,403 
N election-years 101 101 101 101 
Notes: Unstandardized errors and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept (Models 1 and 2) and random 
intercept logistic regression models (Models 3 and 4) explaining the ideological distance to the party of choice 
(Models 1 and 2) or voting for the closest party (Models 3 and 4). Election samples with less than 400 observations 
were excluded from the analyses. Voters living in Swiss cantons where voting was compulsory (weak or strictly 
enforced) as well were excluded from the analyses. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Model 1 
includes election dummies for Mexico 1997, Peru 2006 and Hungary 2002. Model 2 includes election dummies for 
Brazil 2002, Australia 1996 and Belgium (Flanders) 2014. Model 3 includes election dummies for Portugal 2005, 
New Zealand 1996 and Switzerland 2011. Model 4 includes election dummies for Australia 2007, Australia 2013 
and Australia 1996. 
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APPENDIX E. 










Reason(s) for exclusion 
2 Albania 2005 Yes Yes Yes  
1 Australia 1996 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Australia 2004 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Australia 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Australia 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Austria 2008 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Austria 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Belarus 2001 No  No No Non-democratic (Freedom House) 
3 Belarus 2008 No No No Non-democratic (Freedom House) 
1 Belgium-Flanders 1999 Yes Yes Yes  
2 Belgium-Flanders 2003 No No No No left-right placement of parties, no 
income 
na Belgium-Flanders 2014 Yes No Yes No lead party (WAL prime 
minister); No direction of party id 
1 Belgium-Wallonia 1999 No No No No party id; no lead party (FL prime 
minister) 
2 Belgium-Wallonia 2003 No No  No No lead party; no left-right 
placement of parties, no income 
na Belgium-Wallonia 2014 Yes No Yes No direction of party id 
2 Brazil 2002 Yes Yes Yes  
3 Brazil 2006 Yes No  No Less than 400 observations  
3 Brazil 2010 Yes No  No Less than 400 observations  
4 Brazil 2014 Yes No  No Less than 400 observations  
2 Bulgaria 2001 No Yes  No No political knowledge 
4 Bulgaria 2014 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Canada 1997 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Canada 2004 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Canada 2008 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Canada 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Chile 1999 No No No Presidential election 
2 Chile 2005 Yes Yes No Less than 400 observations  
3 Chile 2009 No Yes No No political knowledge 
3 Croatia 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Czech Republic 1996 Yes No Yes No information on GDP 
2 Czech Republic 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Czech Republic 2006 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Czech Republic 2010 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Czech Republic 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
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1 Denmark 1998 No Yes No No political knowledge 
2 Denmark 2001 No Yes No No political knowledge 
3 Denmark 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Estonia 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Finland 2003 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Finland 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Finland 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
2 France 2002 No No No Presidential election 
3 France 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
4 France 2012 No No No Presidential election 
1 Germany 1998 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Germany 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Germany 2005 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Germany 2009 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Germany 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Great Britain 1997 Yes Yes Yes  
2 Great Britain 2005 Yes Yes Yes  
3 Greece 2009 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Greece 2012 Yes No Yes No lead party (caretaker 
government) 
1 Hong Kong 1998 Yes No Yes No information on lead party 
1 Hong Kong 2000 Yes No No Less than 400 observations 
2 Hong Kong 2004 Yes No No Less than 400 observations 
3 Hong Kong 2008 Yes No No Less than 400 observations 
1 Hungary 1998 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Hungary 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Iceland 1999 No Yes No No political knowledge 
2 Iceland 2003 No Yes No No political knowledge 
3 Iceland 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Iceland 2009 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Iceland 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Ireland 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Ireland 2007 No  No No Coding error in college education 
variable 
4 Ireland 2011 No Yes No No political knowledge 
1 Israel 1996 No Yes No Less than 400 observations 
2 Israel 2003 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Israel 2006 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Israel 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Italy 2006 Yes No  No Less than 400 observations  
1 Japan 1996 No No No No political knowledge; no left-right 
self-placement 
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2 Japan 2004 No No No No left-right self-placement; no 
information on lead party 
3 Japan 2007 No No No No left-right placement of parties 
4 Japan 2013 No No No No left-right placement of parties 
2 Kyrgyzstan 2005 No No No Non-democratic (Freedom House) 
3 Latvia 2010 No No No No income; no party id 
1 Lithuania 1997 No No No Presidential election 
1 Mexico 1997 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Mexico 2000 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Mexico 2003 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Mexico 2006 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Mexico 2009 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Mexico 2012 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Mexico 2015 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Montenegro 2012 Yes No No No info on unemployment; Less than 
400 observations 
1 Netherlands 1998 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Netherlands 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Netherlands 2006 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Netherlands 2010 Yes Yes Yes   
1 New Zealand 1996 Yes Yes Yes   
2 New Zealand 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
3 New Zealand 2008 Yes Yes Yes   
4 New Zealand 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Norway 1997 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Norway 2001 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Norway 2005 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Norway 2009 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Norway 2013 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Peru 2000 No No No No vote choice; no age; no political 
knowledge 
1 Peru 2001 No No No No vote choice; no age; no political 
knowledge; no party id 
2 Peru 2006 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Peru 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Philippines 2004 No No No Incomplete data 
3 Philippines 2010 Yes No No No vote choice 
1 Poland 1997 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Poland 2001 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Poland 2005 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Poland 2007 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Poland 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
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1 Portugal 2002 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Portugal 2002 No No No Respondents already included 
(Module 1) 
2 Portugal 2005 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Portugal 2009 Yes Yes Yes   
4 Portugal 2015 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Romania 1996 Yes Yes No Less than 400 observations  
2 Romania 2004 No No No Less than 400 observations  
3 Romania 2009 No No No Presidential election 
2 Russia 2004 No No No Presidential election 
4 Serbia 2012 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Slovakia 2010 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Slovenia 1996 No Yes No No political knowledge 
2 Slovenia 2004 Yes No  No Less than 400 observations  
3 Slovenia 2008 No Yes No No political knowledge 
4 Slovenia 2011 Yes Yes Yes   
3 South Africa 2009 No Yes Yes No income 
1 South Korea 2000 No No No No vote choice; no political 
knowledge 
2 South Korea 2004 Yes Yes Yes  
3 South Korea 2008 Yes Yes Yes  
4 South Korea 2012 No No No No income; no college education 
1 Spain 1996 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Spain 2000 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Spain 2004 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Spain 2008 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Sweden 1998 Yes Yes Yes  
2 Sweden 2002 Yes Yes Yes  
3 Sweden 2006 Yes Yes Yes  
4 Sweden 2014 Yes No Yes  
1 Switzerland 1999 Yes No Yes No lead party 
2 Switzerland 2003 Yes No Yes No lead party 
3 Switzerland 2007 Yes No Yes No lead party 
4 Switzerland 2011 Yes No Yes No lead party 
1 Taiwan 1996 No No No Presidential election 
2 Taiwan 2001 Yes Yes Yes   
2 Taiwan 2004 No No No Presidential election 
3 Taiwan 2008 No No No Presidential election 
4 Taiwan 2012 No No No No left-right self placement 
1 Thailand 2001 No No No No info on lead party; no political 
knowledge; no unemployment; no 
left-right self placement 
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3 Thailand 2007 No No No Non-democratic (Freedom House) 
4 Thailand 2011 Yes No  No No left-right self placement 
3 Turkey 2011 No Yes No No political knowledge 
4 Turkey 2015 Yes Yes Yes   
1 Ukraine 1998 Yes No No No info on lead party; less than 400 
observations 
1 United States 1996 No No No No left-right placement of parties 
2 United States 2004 Yes Yes Yes   
3 United States 2008 Yes Yes Yes   
4 United States 2012 Yes Yes Yes   
3 Uruguay 2009 No Yes No No political knowledge 
 
